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Abstract
For a many-to-one matching market where firms have strict and q-responsive preferences,
we give a characterization of the strongly stable fractional matching set as the union of the
convex hull of connected sets of stable matchings.
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1 Introduction:
A large part of the matching literature studies many-to-one matching markets. The agents in
these markets are divided into two disjoint sets: The many-side of the market, namely resident
doctors, students, workers, etc, and the one-side, namely hospitals, college, firms, etc, The main
property studied in the matching literature is the stability. A matching is called stable if all
agents have acceptable partners and there is no unmatched pair (hospital-doctor, college-student,
firm-worker, etc.), where both agents would prefer to be matched to each other rather than
staying with their current partners under the proposed matching. Each agent has a preference
list that determines an order over the agents or sets of agents on the other side of the market,
with the possibility of staying unmatched. In this paper the firms have q-responsive and strict
preferences.
Linear programming is a widely used mathematical tool in matching theory. Each matching
can be represented by an assignment matrix called the incidence vector of the matching.
Vande Vate [19] and Rothblum [16] present a system of linear inequalities that characterizes
the stable matching of the marriage market for two different restrictions of the market. Both
papers show that the stable matchings for the marriage market correspond to the set of incidence
vectors (integer solutions for linear inequalities). In other words, the stable matchings are exactly
the extreme points of the polytope generated by the system of linear inequalities. Roth et al.
[15], for the marriage market, introduce a linear program that characterizes all stable matchings
as the integer solutions.
∗paneme@unsl.edu.ar (P. Neme); joviedo@unsl.edu.ar (J. Oviedo).
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Linear programming approach has been developed to the theory of stable matching markets
also by Abeledo and Rothblum [4] [3], Abeledo and Blum [1], Abeledo et al. [2], Fleiner [9], [8],
Sethuraman and Teo [18] and by others.
Ba¨ıou and Balinski [5] present two characterizations of the convex polytope for the many-to-
one matching market. We focus on one of these characterizations.
Lotteries over stable matchings has been study in many instance in the literature. Roth et
al. [15] for the marriage market, studied lotteries over stable matching via linear programming.
When the extreme points of the convex polytope generated by the constraints of a linear program
are exactly the stable matchings of the market, for instance the marriage market, a random
matching coincides with the concept of stable fractional matching. Roth et al. [15] defines
stable fractional matching as a not necessarily integer solution of the linear program. When the
extreme points are not all integer, these two concept are not the same, for instance a many-to-one
matching market with q-responsive and strict preferences. That is to say, a random matching
is always a stable fractional matching, but some stable fractional matching can not be written
as a lottery over stable matchings. Example 1 expose a many-to-one matching market with an
extreme point that is a stable fractional matching.
Each entry of an incidence vector of a stable fractional matching can be interpreted as the
time that each agent spends with one agent on the other side of the market. For a stable fractional
matching, it can happen that two agents, one of each side of the market, have an incentive to
increase the time that they spend together at the expense of those matched agents that they like
less than each other at a stable fractional matching. To study a ”good” fractional solution, the
idea is to avoid this and prevent that agents have incentive ”block” the stable fractional matching
in a fractional way. For a Marriage Market, Roth et al. [15] define a strongly stable fractional
matching as a stable fractional matching that fulfill a non-linear equalities that represent this
non-blocking condition mentioned above. In other words, a stable fractional matching that
fulfill the non-linear equalities from Roth et al. [15], is a strongly stable fractional matching.
Neme and Oviedo [13] give a characteriazation of the strongly stable fractional matching for the
marriage market. Our work extends their result and provides a characterization for the many-
to-one strongly stable fractional matching set. We analyze the linear programming structure for
the many-to-one matching market when the firms have q-responsive preferences. We extend the
strong stability condition from Roth et al. [15] to a many-to-one matching market. We focus
on one of the characterizations of Ba¨ıou and Balinski [5]. As we mentioned before, the convex
polytope generated by the linear inequalities of this characterization may have fractional extreme
points. We prove that these fractional extreme points violate our strong stability condition.
In the school choice set-up, strong stability for lotteries has been introduced by Kesten
and U¨nver [11], they called ex-ante stability for lotteries. For this market, they deal with
indifferences in the preferences of the schools. Kesten and U¨nver [11] also present a fractional
deferred-acceptance algorithm that computes a unique strongly ex-ante random matching. Their
paper analyses strategy proofness and efficiency of this mechanism. Our characterization goes
in another direction, we study the relationship between the stable matchings that are involve in
the lotteries.
Bansal et al. [6] and Cheng et al. [7] study the concept of cycles in preferences and cyclic
matchings for many-to-many and many-to-one matching markets, respectively. These papers
are an extension of Irving and Leather [10]. To seek for cycles in preferences, these authors first
2
reduce the preference lists of all agents. We present the reduction procedure for our market in
the Appendix. This reduction procedure allows us to find cycles in preferences. Since the cycles
of a reduced list are disjoint, we extend the definition of cyclic matching to a set of cycles in the
reduced preference profile.
Following the extension of cyclic matching used by Bansal et al. [6] and Cheng et al. [7],
we define a connected set generated by a stable matching µ as the set of all cyclic matching
of µ (including µ). Then, we characterize a strongly stable fractional matching as a lottery
over stable matchings that belong to the same connected set. Moreover, we prove that these
stable matching of the lottery, have a decreasing order on the eyes of all firms. In this way, we
characterize the set of all strongly stable fractional matchings as the union of the convex hull of
these connected sets.
Roth et al. [15], (in Corollary 21) proves that in a strongly stable fractional matching, each
agent is matched with at most two agents of the other side of the market. Schlegel [17] generalizes
this result for the school choice set-up with strict priorities. They show that an ex-ante stable
lottery fulfills that each worker has a positive probability with at most two distinct firms, and
for each firm, all but possibly one position are assigned deterministically. For the one position
that is assigned by a lottery, two workers have a positive probability of been employed. Our
characterization gives an alternative prove for this two result, for the school choice set-up due to
Schlegel [17] is straigtforgard, and for the marriage marker due to Roth et al. [15], its necessary
only to set all quotas of all firms equal to one.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally introduces the market, preliminary
results, and one of Ba¨ıou and Balinski’s characterizations of stable matchings [5]. Section 3 dis-
cusses the definition of strongly stable fractional matching and some properties of these fractional
matchings. We also discuss cycles and cyclic matching properties. In section 4, we present our
characterization of a strongly stable fractional matching. The Appendix contains the reduction
procedure, lemmas and proofs of the lemmas needed for our characterization.
2 Preliminary Results.
In the many-to-one matching markets that we study, there are two sets of agents, the set of firms
F = {f1, ..., fn} and the set of workersW = {w1, ..., wm}. Each worker w has an antisymmetric,
transitive, and complete preference relation Pw over F ∪{w}, and each firm f an antisymmetric,
transitive, and complete preferences relation Pf over set of workers, 2
W . Also, each firm f has a
maximum number of positions to fill: their quota, denoted by qf . Given W0,W1 ⊆W , we write
W0 ≥f W1 to indicate that the firm f likes W0 as much as W1. Given the preference relation
Pf , we say that W0 >f W1 when W0 ≥f W1 and W0 6= W1. Analogously, for each worker w,
and any two firms, f0, f1 ∈ F , we write f0 ≥w f1 and f0 >w f1.
The preference profiles are (n+m)− tuples of preference relations and they are denoted by
P = (Pf1 , ..., Pfn , Pw1 , ..., Pwm). The matching market for the sets W and F with the preference
profiles P will be denoted by (F,W,P ).
We say that a pair (f, w) ∈ F ×W is an acceptable pair if w is acceptable for the firm f , and
f is acceptable for the worker w, that is {w} ≥f ∅ and f ≥w w. Let us denote by A(P ) the set
of all acceptable pairs of the matching market (F,W,P ), (simply A, when no confusion arises).
The assignment problem consist in matching workers with firms keeping the bilateral nature
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of their relationship and allowing for the possibility that firm and workers remain unmatched.
Formally,
Definition 1. A matching µ is a mapping from the set F ∪W into the set of all subsets of
F ∪W such that, for all w ∈W and f ∈ F :
1. |µ(w)| = 1 and µ(w) ⊆ F or µ(w) = {w} if µ(w) 6⊆ F .
2. µ(f) ∈ 2W and |µ(f)| ≤ qf .
3. µ(w) = {f} if and only if w ∈ µ(f).
Usually we will omit the curly brackets, for instance, instead of condition 1. and 3., we will
write: 1. |µ(w)| = 1 and µ(w) ⊆ F or µ(w) = w if µ(w) 6⊆ F and 3. µ(w) = f if and only if
w ∈ µ(f). Assume that each firm f gives its ranking of workers individually, and orders subsets
of workers in a responsive manner. That is to say, adding ”good” workers to a set leads to a
better set, whereas adding ”bad” workers to a set leads to a worse set. In addition, for any two
subsets that differ in only one worker, the firm prefers the subset containing the most preferred
worker.
Definition 2. The preference relation Pf over 2
W is qf -responsive if it satisfies the following
conditions:
1. For all T ⊆W such that |T | > qf , we have that f >f T .
2. For all T ⊆W such that |T | < qf and w 6∈ T , we have that
T ∪ {w} >f T if and only if w >f f.
3. For all T ⊆ S such that |T | < qf and w,w′ 6∈ T , we have
T ∪ {w} >f T ∪ {w
′} if and only if w >f w
′.
Let µ >F µ
′ denote that all firms like µ at least as well as µ′ with al least one firm preferring
µ to µ′ outright, that is, that µ(f) ≥f µ′(f) for all f , and µ(f ′) >f ′ µ′(f ′) for at least one firm
f ′. Analogously µ >W µ
′ for the set of workers. We say that µ ≥F µ′ means that either µ >F µ′
or µ = µ′. Analogously µ ≥W µ′ for the set of workers.
We say that a matching µ is individually rational, if µ(w) = f for some worker w and firm f ,
such that the pair (f, w) is an acceptable pair. Similarly, a pair (f, w) is a blocking pair for the
matching µ, if the worker w is not employed by the firm f , but they both prefer to be matched
to one another. That is, a matching µ is blocked by a firm-worker pair (f, w):
a) If |µ(f)| = qf , µ(w) 6= f, f >w µ(w) and w >f w′ for some w′ ∈ µ(f).
b) If |µ(f)| < qf , µ(w) 6= f and f >w µ(w) and w >f f.
In that way, a matching µ is stable if it is individually rational and has no blocking pairs.
One of the most important results of the matching theory is called the Rural Hospital Theo-
rem. It states that any firm that does not fill its quota in some stable matching will be matched
to the same workers in every stable matching. Formally:
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Theorem 1. (Roth [14]) When preferences over individuals are strict, any hospital that does
not fill its quota at some stable matching is assigned precisely the same set of students at every
stable matching.
2.1 Linear Programming Approach.
For the marriage market, Rothblum [16] characterizes stable matchings as extreme points of a
convex polytope generated by a linear inequality system. Ba¨ıou and Balinski [5] present two
generalizations of the convex polytope for the many-to-one matching market (F,W,P ) with
qf−responsive preferences.
Given a matching µ, a vector xµ ∈ {0, 1}|F |×|W | is an incidence vector when xµf,w = 1
if and only if µ (w) = f and xµf,w = 0 otherwise. When no confusion arises, we identify each
matching with its incidence vector.
Let PC be the convex polytpe generated by the following linear inequalities:
∑
j∈W
xf,j ≤ qf f ∈ F (1)
∑
i∈F
xi,w ≤ 1 w ∈ W (2)
∑
j>fw
xf,j + qf
∑
i>wf
xi,w + qfxf,w ≥ qf (f, w) ∈ A (3)
xf,w ≥ 0 (f, w) ∈ F ×W (4)
xf,w = 0 (f, w) ∈ F ×W \A (5)
Lemma 1. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. µ is a stable matching for
(F,W,P ) if and only if its incidence vector satisfies the linear inequalities (1)-(5).
Remark 1. Notice that, an integer vector that satisfies the linear inequalities (1), (2) and (4),
represent the incidence vector of a matching for the many-to-one matching market. A not integer
solution of linear inequalities (1), (2) and (4) we will called a fractional matching.
We will define a stable fractional matching as a not necessarily integer point of the convex
polytope PC. That is, a stable fractional matching is a not necessarily integer solution for the
system of linear inequalities (1)-(5). For the marriage market, i.e. qf = 1 for all f ∈ F , Rothblum
[16] prove that the extreme points of the associated convex polytope, are the stable matchings.
It is naturally expected that this result carries over to the more general case, a many-to-one
matching market. But this is not true for the convex polytope PC. Here, we present an example
taken from Ba¨ıou and Balinski [5] that shows a many-to-one market, where the convex polytope
has fractional extreme points. This also shows that a lottery over stable matchings is also a
stable fractional matching. However, the opposite case does not always hold.
Example 1. Let F = {f1, f2} and W = {w1, w2, w3, w4} with the following lists of preferences:
P (f1) = w1, w2, w3, w4 P (w1) = f2, f1
P (f2) = w4, w3, w2, w1 P (w2) = f2, f1
P (w3) = f2, f1
P (w3) = f1, f2
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The quotas for the firms are q1 = q2 = 2. The only two stable matching for this market are:
xµF =
[
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
]
; xµW =
[
1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0
]
.
Ba¨ıou and Balinski observe that the stable fractional matching
x1 =
[
1 12
1
2 0
0 12
1
2 1
]
,
is a vertex of the convex polytope PC.
Observing that the convex polytope has fractional extreme points, Ba¨ıou and Balinski [5]
present a second generalization for the many-to-one matching market. In this second general-
ization, the extreme points of the convex polytope (PCB−B), are exactly the stable matchings
for a many-to-one market. This assures that this last convex polytope, PCB−B, is a subset of
the convex polytope PC. For that reason, our study is based on the convex polytope PC.
3 The Strongly Stable Fractional Matchings.
Each entry of the matrix that represent a stable fractional matching, xf,w, can be interpreted as
the time that firm f and worker w spends with each other. For a stable fractional matching x, it
can happen that two agents, one of each side or the market, have an incentive to increase the time
that they spend together at the expense of those they like less at a stable fractional matching
x. The importance of a strongly stable fractional matching, is to avoid this and prevent that
agents have incentive ”block” the stable fractional matching in a fractional way. We formally
present the definition of a strongly stable fractional matching for our market.
Definition 3. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let us consider a stable frac-
tional matching x¯. We say that x¯ is strongly stable if for all (f, w) ∈ A, x¯ satisfies the strong
stability condition 
qf − ∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w

 = 0. (6)
Remark 2. The incidence vector of a stable matching, also fulfill condition (6).
Lemma 2. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let x¯ be a strongly stable fractional
matching, such that x¯ = αy+ (1−α)z, with 0 < α < 1, where y and z satisfy linear inequalities
(1), (2), (4) and (5)(i.e. y and z are fractional matchings). Then, for all (f, w) ∈ A we have
that either 
qf − ∑
j≥fw
yf,j = 0

 and

qf − ∑
j≥fw
zf,j = 0


or 
1− ∑
i≥wf
yi,w = 0

 and

1− ∑
i≥wf
zi,w = 0


Proof. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let x¯ be a strongly stable fractional
matching, such that x¯ = αy+ (1− α)z, with 0 < α < 1 where y and z satisfy linear inequalities
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(1), (2), (4) and (5). Then, for all (f, w) ∈ A(P ),

qf − ∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w

 = 0

qf − ∑
j≥fw
αyf,j + (1− α)zf,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥wf
αyi,w + (1− α)zi,w

 = 0

qf − α ∑
j≥fw
yf,j − (1− α)
∑
j≥fw
zf,j

 ·

1− α ∑
i≥wf
yi,w − (1− α)
∑
i≥wf
zi,w

 = 0

α

qf − ∑
j≥fw
yf,j

+ (1− α)

qf − ∑
j≥fw
zf,j



 ·

α

1− ∑
i≥wf
yi,w

+ (1− α)

1− ∑
i≥wf
zi,w



 = 0
From inequality (1) and (2) for y and z, we have that
qf −
∑
j≥fw
yf,j ≥ 0, qf −
∑
j≥fw
zf,j ≥ 0,
1−
∑
i≥wf
yf,j ≥ 0 and 1−
∑
j≥wf
zf,j ≥ 0.
Then, we can assure that either

qf − ∑
j≥fw
yf,j = 0

 and

qf − ∑
j≥fw
zf,j = 0


or 
1− ∑
i≥wf
yi,w = 0

 and

1− ∑
i≥wf
zi,w = 0

 .
Notice that the extreme points of the convex polytope generated by linear inequalities (1),(2),
(4) and (5) are all integer points. This convex polytope is known as the polytope of the trans-
portation problem. For more detail, see Luenberger and Ye [12].
The following proposition states that a strongly stable fractional matching can be written as
a lottery over stable matchings. Formally:
Proposition 1. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let x¯ be a strongly stable
fractional matching. Then, there is a collection of stable matchings µp, such that x¯ =
∑k
p=1 αpµ
p
with 0 < αp ≤ 1 and
∑k
p=1 αp = 1.
Proof. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let x¯ be a strongly stable fractional
matching. Then, x¯ fulfill linear inequalities (1),(2), (4) and (5). Hence, x¯ =
∑k
p=1 αpµ
p, with
0 < αp ≤ 1 and
∑k
p=1 αp = 1, where µ
p are individually rational matchings. That is, for
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p = 1, ..., k µp fulfill linear inequalities (1),(2), (4) and (5). We need to prove µp is stable for all
p = 1, ..., k. Then,
x¯ =
k∑
p=1
αpµ
p = αkµ
k +
k−1∑
p=1
αpµ
p = αkµ
k + (1− αk)y,
where y =
∑k−1
p=1 αpµ
p. By Lemma 2, µk and y fulfill Condition (6). That is, µk is stable and
y is strongly stable. Since y fulfill linear inequalities (1),(2), (4) and (5), then y =
∑k−1
p=1 βpµ
p,
with 0 < βp < 1 and
∑k
p=1 βp = 1, where µ
p are individually rational matchings. Then,
y =
k−1∑
p=1
βpµ
p = βk−1µ
k−1 +
k−2∑
p=1
βpµ
p = βk−1µ
k−1 + (1− βk−1)z,
where z =
∑k−2
p=1 βpµ
p. Notice that βp =
αp
(1−αk)
. Hence, by Lemma 2 µk−1 and z fulfill Condition
(6). That is, µk−1 is stable and z is strongly stable. Continuing with the same argument, we
have that µp is stable for all p = 1, ..., k.
We denote supp(x) to be the support of the fractional matching x, that is, supp(x) = {(f, w) :
xf,w > 0}. The following theorem states that no non-integer extreme points of the convex
polytope PC is a strongly stable fractional matching.
Theorem 2. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let x be a non-integer extreme
point of the convex polytope PC. Then, x cannot be a strongly stable fractional matching.
Proof. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let x be a non-integer extreme point of
the convex polytope PC, then x cannot be written as convex combination of points of the convex
polytope PC. Since x satisfies linear inequalities (1)-(5), x can be written as a convex combination
of the extreme points of the convex polytope generated only by the linear inequalities (1),(2),
(4) and (5). That is, x is a convex combination of matchings. Then, there exits a (not stable)
matching whose support is included in the support of the stable fractional matching x. Then,
by Proposition 1, x is not a strongly stable fractional matching.
Remark 3. The previous theorem assures that if a non-integer matching is strongly stable, then
it is an stable fractional matching. Hence, the set of the strongly stable fractional matchings
is included in the set of the lottery over stable matchings, and this one in turn is included
in the set of stable fractional matchings.
3.1 Cycles in Preferences.
For a marriage market, Irving and Leather [10] define a cycle in preference and cyclic matching
in order to present an algorithm that finds all stable matchings for this market. Bansal et al.
[6] and Cheng et al. [7] extend the concept of cycles and cyclic matchings for a many-to-many
and many-to-one matching markets, respectively. We will state some properties of cycles that
are taken from these authors. They refer to the cycles as rotations.
Given a stable matching µ for a many-to-one matching market (F,W,P ), we define a reduced
preference profile Pµ, as the preference profile obtained after the the reduction procedure.
This reduction procedure is presented in the Appendix. The order in the reduced preference list
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of firm f , Pµ(f) is denoted by >µf (≥
µ
f ). In the same way, >
µ
w (≥
µ
w) is the order in worker w
reduced list of preference.
Lemma 3 (Bansal et al. [6]). Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market, and let µ′ be
a matching. Then, µ′ is stable under Pµ if and only if it is stable under the original preference
profile and µ >F µ
′.
Definition 4. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Given a stable matching µ,
and the reduced preference profile Pµ, a set of firms σ = {e1, ..., er} ⊆ F defines a cycle if:
a) wed 6∈ µ(ed), wed ≥ed w
′ for all w′ 6∈ µ(ed), and wed ∈ µ(ed+1) for all d = 1, ..., r − 1.
b) Moreover, wer 6∈ µ(er), wer ≥er w
′ for all w′ 6∈ µ(er), and wer ∈ µ(e1).
Given a cycle σ, we can define a cyclic matching as follows:
Definition 5. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Given a stable matching µ,
and the reduced preference profile Pµ, let σ = {e1, ..., er} be a cycle in Pµ, and {we1 , ..., wer}
defined by the cycle σ. We define the matching µ[σ] as follows:


µ[σ](e1) = µ(e1)− {wer} ∪ {we1},
µ[σ](ed) = µ(ed)− {wed−1} ∪ {wed} for d = 2, ..., r − 1,
µ[σ](er) = µ(er)− {wer−1} ∪ {wer}
µ[σ](f) = µ(f) for all f 6∈ σ.
Notice that if a firm f belongs to a cycle σ, this means that it has different sets of workers
assigned in µ as well as in µ[σ]. Then, by the Rural Hospital Theorem, we have that |µ(f)| = qf .
Lemma 4 (Bansal et al. [6]). Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. For a stable
matching µ, the reduced preference profile Pµ, and a cycle σ in Pµ, the cyclic matching µ[σ] is
a stable matching in the original preference profile.
Let Φ(µ) denote the set of cycles of the reduced preference profile Pµ. Now, we can extend
the definition of a cyclic matching as fallows.
Definition 6. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. For a stable matching µ, and
the reduced preference profile Pµ, let K = {σ1, ..., σn} ⊆ Φ(µ), define the cyclic matching µ[K]
µ[K](f) =
{
µ[σh](f) f ∈ σh, h = 1, ..., n
µ(f) otherwise.
Remark 4. Let K ⊆ Φ(µ) be a subset of cycles of Pµ. By Lemma (5), we have that µ[K](f) =
µ[σ](f) for each f ∈ σ with σ ∈ K .
Lemma 5 (Cheng et al. [7]). Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market, for the reduced
preference profile Pµ, and two different cycles σs and σl in Φ(µ). Then, σs ∩ σl = ∅.
Notice that Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 assure that the cyclic matching µ[K] from Definition 6
is stable under the original preference profile.
Lemma 6 (Cheng et al. [7]). Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let Pµ be the
reduced preference profile, and let µ′ be a stable matching in Pµ. If µ 6= µ′, then a cycle σ ∈ Pµ
exists such that µ[σ] ≥F µ′.
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Lemma 7. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. For the reduced preference profile
Pµ, and two different cycles σs and σl in Φ(µ). Then, σs is a cycle of P
µl = Pµ[σl].
Proof. See the Appendix.
The matching obtained by applying different cycles is independent from the order in witch
they are applied.
Lemma 8. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let Pµ be the reduced preference
profile, and let σs and σl be two different cycles in Φ(µ). Then,
µ[σl, σs] = µ[σs, σl].
Proof. See the Appendix.
4 A characterization of the strongly stable fractional match-
ing set.
The characterization of a strongly stable fractional matching that we present is based on the
idea of cyclic matchings. So, we need that a stable fractional matching that is strongly stable
in a reduced preference profile is also strongly stable in the original preference profile. This
statement is proved on Lemma 10 in the Appendix.
In order to present our characterization, we define the connected set generated by a stable
matching.
Definition 7. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. A set of stable matchings M
is connected if there is a stable matching µ such that:
M = {µ[K] : K ⊆ Φ(µ)}.
In this case, we say that M is generated by µ, and we write M =Mµ.
Notice that from definition of µ[K], we can see that µ is also a cyclic matching of itself. That
is, if K = ∅, then µ[K] = µ, hence µ ∈ Mµ. The following theorem presents a property that
fulfills any convex combination of stable matchings from a connected set.
Theorem 3. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Then, any convex combination
of stable matchings from a connected set is a strongly stable fractional matching.
Proof. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let x¯ be a convex combination of
stable matchings from a connected set. That is, there exists a stable matching µ and its reduced
preference profile Pµ. In Pµ, there existK1, ...,Kt ⊆ Φ(µ) and the corresponding cyclic matching
µ1, ..., µt, such that x¯ =
∑t
l=1 αlx
µl with 0 ≤ αl ≤ 1 and
∑t
l=1 αl = 1.
Since x¯ is a convex combination of stable matchings from Mµ, we have that µ ≥F µl for
all l = 1, ..., t. Then, we have that x¯ is a stable fractional matching for the matching market
(F,W,Pµ). Moreover, since S(Pµ) ⊆ S(P ), we have that x¯ is also a stable fractional matching
for the matching market (F,W,P ). By Lemma 10, we only need to prove that x¯ is strongly
stable in the reduced preference profile Pµ.
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If αl = 1 for some l = 1, ..., t, we have that x¯ = x
µl . Since µl is also a stable matching in the
original preferences, then we have that x¯ is strongly stable. Hence, we assume 0 < αl < 1. We
will prove that x¯ fulfill Condition (6) for all pair (f, w) ∈ A(Pµ).
Fix f ∈ F . Assume that firm f does not fill its quota, the Rural Hospital Theorem assures
that this firm will always be assigned to the same set of workers in every stable matching. Then
x¯f,j = x
µl
f,j for l = 1, ..., t and for all j such that (f, j) ∈ A(P
µ). Since µl is a stable matching
for l = 1, ..., t, it fulfills Condition (6) for each (f, j) ∈ A(Pµ). Then, by Remark 2 we have that
x¯ also fulfill Condition (6) for each (f, j) ∈ A(Pµ).
Assume now that f does fill its quota. Let K =
⋃t
l=1Kl. Let µ(f) = {w1, ..., wqf } and
wi >f wi+1. We analyze two cases separately.
1. There is no σ ∈ K such that f ∈ σ. By Definition 6,we have that µ[K](f) = µ(f). That is,
for all j ∈W , x¯f,j = x
µ
f,j .
Thus, if w ≤f wqf we have that
∑
j≥µ
f
w
x¯f,j =
∑
j≥µ
f
w
xµf,j = qf .
If w >f wqf , we have that ∑
j≥µ
f
w
x¯f,j =
∑
j≥µ
f
w
xµf,j < qf .
Then, we also have that
∑
j>
µ
f
w x
µ
f,j < qf . Moreover, by linear inequality (3) for the stable
matching µ, we have that
∑
i≥µwf
xµi,w > 0. Therefore,
∑
i≥µwf
xµi,w = 1. Lemma 11 states
that x¯ µW x
µ, i.e., ∑
i≥µwf
x¯i,w ≥
∑
i≥µwf
xµi,w = 1.
By the linear inequality (2), we have that
∑
i≥µwf
x¯i,w = 1. Thus, for (f, w) ∈ A(Pµ), we
have that 
qf − ∑
j≥µ
f
w
x¯f,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥µwf
x¯i,w

 = 0.
2. There is σf ∈ K such that f ∈ σf . By Lemma 5, we have that there is a unique cycle σf ∈ Kl
such that f ∈ σf . But σf may be in more than one set Kl. We denote Lf = {l : σf ∈ Kl}.
Therefore,
x¯f,j =
t∑
l=1
αlx
µl
f,j =
∑
l∈Lf
αlx
µl
f,j +
∑
l 6∈Lf
αlx
µl
f,j .
Since σf is unique, by Lemma 5, we have that µ[Kl](f) = µ[σf ](f) and x
µl
f,j = x
µ[σf ]
f,j for
those l ∈ Lf .
Also, µ[Kl](f) = µ(f) and x
µl
f,j = x
µ
f,j for those l 6∈ Lf . Hence,
∑
l∈Lf
αlx
µl
f,j +
∑
l 6∈Lf
αlx
µl
f,j =
∑
l∈Lf
αlx
µ[σf ]
f,j +
∑
l 6∈Lf
αlx
µ
f,j =
11
x
µ[σf ]
f,j

∑
l∈Lf
αl

+ xµf,j

∑
l 6∈Lf
αl

 . (7)
Since
∑
l∈Lf
αl +
∑
l 6∈Lf
αl = 1, then we define α¯ =
∑
l∈Lf
αl.
Then (7) is equal to α¯x
µ[σf ]
f,j +(1− α¯)x
µ
f,j . That is, x¯f,j is the convex combination of x
µ[σf ]
f,j
and xµf,j .
Since f ∈ σf , we have that
|supp(x
µ[σf ]
f,· )| = |supp(x
µ
f,·)| = qf and |supp(x
µ[σf ]
f,· ) ∩ supp(x
µ
f,·)| = qf − 1.
Then, there is a unique wa such that (f, wa) ∈ supp(xµ) \ supp(xµ[σf ]) and a unique wb
such that (f, wb) ∈ supp(xµ[σf ]) \ supp(xµ), and we also denote by T = {ws : (f, ws) ∈
supp(xµ) ∩ supp(xµ[σf ])}. Then,
x¯f,j =


1 if j ∈ T
1− α¯ if j = wa
α¯ if j = wb.
Now we will prove that x¯ fulfills Condition (6) in Pµ for all w:
i) If w ≤f wb, then
∑
j≥µ
f
w
x¯f,j =
∑
s∈T
x¯f,ws + x¯f,wa + x¯f,wb = (qf − 1) + (1− α¯) + α¯ = qf .
Then, 
qf − ∑
j≥µ
f
w
x¯f,j

 = 0,
hence, 
qf − ∑
j≥µ
f
w
x¯f,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥µwf
x¯i,w

 = 0.
ii) If w >µf wqf , then ∑
j≥µ
f
wqf
x¯f,j < qf .
Since
qf >
∑
j≥µ
f
wqf
x¯f,j = (1− α¯)
∑
j≥µ
f
wqf
xµf,j + α¯
∑
j≥µ
f
wqf
x
µ[σf ]
f,j ,
then we have that
∑
j≥µ
f
wqf
xµf,j < qf and
∑
j≥µ
f
wqf
x
µ[σf ]
f,j < qf .
But µ and µ[σ] are stable matchings, and these stable matchings fulfill Condition (6).
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So we have that ∑
i≥µwf
xµi,w = 1 and
∑
i≥µwf
x
µ[σf ]
i,w = 1,
in which case we can assure that
∑
i≥µwf
x¯i,w = (1− α¯)
∑
i≥µwf
xµi,w + α¯
∑
i≥µwf
x
µ[σf ]
i,w = 1.
That is, 
qf − ∑
j≥µ
f
w
x¯f,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥µwf
x¯i,w

 = 0.
iii) If w = wqf . From definition of µ, we have that µ(wqf ) = f . Also, we have that ,
µl(wqf ) >
µ
F µ and µ ≥W µ
l for all l = 1, ..., t. In particular, µl(wqf ) ≥
µ
wqf
µ(wqf ) = f
for all l = 1, ..., t. This implies that
∑
i≥µwqf
f
xµ
l
i,wqf
= 1
for all l = 1, ..., t. Hence
∑
i≥µwqf
f
x¯i,wqf =
∑
i≥µwqf
f
t∑
l=1
αlx
µl
i,wqf
=
t∑
l=1
αl
∑
i≥µwqf
f
xµ
l
i,wqf
=
t∑
l=1
αl = 1.
Then, 
qf − ∑
j≥µ
f
wqf
x¯f,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥µwqf
f
x¯i,wqf

 = 0.
From Cases 1 and 2, we have that for the pair (f, w),

qf − ∑
j≥µ
f
w
x¯f,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥µwf
x¯i,w

 = 0.
Therefore, x¯ is a strongly stable fractional matching in the reduced preference profile Pµ,
and by Lemma 10, x¯ is a strongly stable fractional matching in the original preference profile
P .
The following corollary extends Corollary 21 from Roth et al. [15], that states that for the
marriage market set-up, under a strongly stable fractional matching, each agent is fractionaly
matched with at most two agents of the other side of the market (set qf = 1 for all f ∈
F ). Another extension is due to Schlegel [17] for a school choice matching market with strict
preferences (Similar set-up than ours).
Corollary 1. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Each strongly stable fractional
matching fulfills the followin 2 conditions:
1. Each worker has a positive probability with at most two distinct firms.
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2. Each firm, all but possibly one position are assigned deterministically. For the one position
that is assigned by a lottery, two workers have a positive probability of been employed.
For the particular case with all quotas equal to one, the marriage market (M,W,P ), and
for a stable fractional matching x, Rothblum [16] defines a stable matching such that it fulfills
the following condition: assign to each man m the most preferred woman among those that
xm,j > 0, for all j ∈ w. Here we generalize this definition for the many-to-one matching market
(F,W,P ).
For a many-to-one matching market (F,W,P ), and for a given stable fractional matching x,
we define the set of workers employed in the best qf positions.
Let C0f (x) = {w : (f, w) ∈ supp(x)}. Let C
1
f (x) = {w ∈ C
0
f (x) : there does not exists w
′ ∈
C0f (x), w
′ >f w}. Notice that the set C1f (x), only has one element, the best worker for firm f
in the supp(x). Let C2f (x) = {w ∈ C
0
f (x) : there does not exists w
′ ∈ C0f (x) \ C
1
f (x), w
′ >f w}.
The set C2f (x), has the two bests workers for firm f in the supp(x). In the same way, let
Ckf (x) = {w ∈ C
0
f (x) : there does not exists w
′ ∈ C0f (x) \ C
k−1
f (x), w
′ >f w}. In this way,
Ckf (x) is the set of the k-best workers in the supp(x). Now, we define the matching where each
firm employs the best qf workers in the supp(x). Formally:
Definition 8. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let x be a stable fractional
matching. For each firm f , we define µx as:
µx(f) = {w ∈ C
0
f (x) : w ∈ C
qf
f (x)}.
Remark 5. If for some firm f we have that |C0f (x)| ≤ qf , then x
µx
f,i = 1 for all i ∈ C
0
f (x).
The following lemma generalizes Lemma 12 of Roth et al. [15].
Lemma 9. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let x¯ be a strongly stable fractional
matching. Then, µx¯ is a stable matching.
Proof. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let x¯ be a strongly stable fractional
matching. First, we will prove that µx¯ is a matching. Assume that all positive entries of x¯ are
equal to 1, then we have by Definition 8 that xµx¯ = x¯. Since x¯ is a strongly stable fractional
matching, by Lemma 1 we have that µx¯ is a stable matching.
Assume now that not all positive entries of x¯ are equal to 1. Also, assume that µx¯ is not a
matching. That is, there exists a worker w and two different firms f and f ′, such that w ∈ µx¯(f)
and w ∈ µx¯(f
′). Since the preferences of the worker w are strict, without loss of generality, we
can assume that f >w f
′. We will show that
∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w = 1, and we analize two cases:
i) |C0f (x¯)| ≤ qf . We have that if
∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j < qf , since x¯ is a stable fractional matching.
Then Condition (6) implies that ∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w = 1.
Hence,
∑
i<wf
x¯i,w = 0, and x¯f ′,w = 0, which contradicts the assumption of x¯f ′,w > 0.
If
∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j = qf , then w ∈ C
qf
f and x¯f,w = 1. This implies that
∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w = 1.
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ii) If |C0f (x¯)| > qf , that is C
qf
f (x¯) ⊂ C
0
f (x¯). Since w ∈ µx¯(f), then w ∈ C
qf
f (x¯), and we have
that ∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j ≤
∑
j∈C
qf
f
(x¯)
x¯f,j <
∑
j∈C0
f
(x¯)
x¯f,j ≤ qf
Hence,
∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j < qf . Since x¯ is a strongly stable fractional matching, Condition (6)
implies that ∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w = 1.
From cases i) and ii), we have that
∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w = 1, then
∑
i<wf
x¯i,w = 0, and also x¯f ′,w = 0
since f >w f
′, which contradicts the assumption of x¯f ′,w > 0. Therefore µx¯ is a matching. Let
w ∈ µx¯(f), then w ∈ C
qf
f (x¯) ⊆ C
0
f (x¯). Hence w >f f and f >w w. Then µx¯ in an individually
rational matching.
Now we will prove that µx¯ has no blocking pairs. Assume that there exists a blocking pair
(f¯ , w¯) of µx¯. Then, we have that:
a) w¯ 6∈ µx¯(f¯).
b) There exists w′ ∈ µx¯(f¯) such that w¯ >f¯ w
′ if |µx¯(f¯)| = qf¯ . Or w¯ >f¯ f¯ if |µx¯(f¯)| < qf¯ .
c) f¯ >w¯ µx¯(w¯).
Since w¯ 6∈ µx¯(f¯), we have that w¯ 6∈ C
qf¯
f¯
(x¯), then we will show that x¯f¯ ,w¯ = 0:
-. If |C
qf
f (x¯)| < qf , then C
qf
f (x¯) = C
0
f (x¯). Hence, since µx¯(f¯) = C
0
f (x¯) and w¯ 6∈ µx¯(f¯), we
have that x¯f¯ ,w¯ = 0.
-. If |C
qf¯
f¯
(x¯)| = qf¯ , since w¯ 6∈ µx¯(f¯), we have that w¯ >f¯ w
′ for all w′ ∈ C
qf¯
f¯
(x¯), then x¯f¯ ,w¯ = 0.
Since x¯f¯ ,w¯ = 0, by item b) we have that
∑
j≥f¯ w¯
x¯f¯ ,j <
∑
j≥f¯w
′ x¯f¯ ,j ≤ qf¯ , and since x¯ is a
strongly stable fractional matching, we have that
1 =
∑
i≥w¯ f¯
x¯i,w¯ = x¯f¯ ,w¯ +
∑
i>w¯ f¯
x¯i,w¯ .
Then,
∑
i<w¯ f¯
x¯i,w¯ = 0, but this is a contradiction since from Definition 8, we have that
x¯µx¯(w¯),w¯ > 0 and item c) f¯ >w¯ µx¯(w¯). Therefore, µx¯ is a stable matching.
The main result of this paper is the characterization that states that x¯ is a strongly stable
fractional matching if and only if it belongs to the convex hull of a connected set. Formally:
Theorem 4. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market and let x¯ be a stable fractional
matching in (F,W,P ). x¯ is strongly stable if and only if there is a collection of connected stable
matchings such that x¯ =
∑k
l=1 αlx
µl , 0 < αl ≤ 1,
∑k
l=1 αl = 1.
Proof. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Theorem 3 proves ⇐).
For⇒), let x¯ be a strongly stable fractional matching. Proposition 1 and Lemma 13, assures
that
x¯ =
k∑
l=1
αlx
µl , 0 < αl ≤ 1,
k∑
l=1
αl = 1,
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with µl ∈ S(P ) for l = 1, ..., k and µ1 >F µ2 >F ... >F µk.
Assume that x¯ /∈ Conv {Mµx¯}. Then, we have that µ
l /∈ Mµx¯ exists. Let t = min{l :
µl /∈Mµx¯}. Since µ
1 = µx¯ ∈ Mµx¯ , we have that t ≥ 2.
Given that µt 6∈ Mµx¯ , and µ
t−1 ∈ Mµx¯ , and µ
t−1 6= µt, we have µt−1 >F µ
t.
Then by Lemma 6, there exists a cycle σ∗ ∈ Φ
(
µt−1
)
such that µt−1[σ∗] 6∈ Mµ1 and
µt−1[σ∗] >F µ
t. Notice that this implies that σ∗ 6∈ Φ(µ1).
Here we analize two cases:
a) If there exists σ ∈ Φ(µ1) such that σ∗ ∩ σ 6= ∅. Then for any f˜ ∈ σ∗ ∩ σ, we have that,
µ1 >f˜ µ
t−1 >f˜ µ
t−1[σ∗] ≥f˜ µ
t. If t = 2, we have that σ∗ ∈ Φ(µ1), and since σ ∩ σ∗ 6= ∅,
then σ = σ∗ which results in a contradiction, and t ≥ 3.
By the Rural Hospital Theorem, there exist w∗, w1, w2 such that:
w1 ∈ µ1(f˜)−
(
µt−1(f˜) ∪ µt−1[σ∗](f˜)
)
,
w∗ ∈ µt−1(f˜)− µ1(f˜),
w2 ∈ µt−1[σ∗](f˜)−
(
µt−1(f˜) ∪ µ1(f˜)
)
,
(8)
and w1 >f˜ w
∗ >f˜ w2. Now, we will prove that for the pair (f˜ , w
∗), Condition (6) fails.
That is, 
qf˜ − ∑
j≥f˜w
∗
x¯f˜ ,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥w∗ f˜
x¯i,w∗

 6= 0.
We will analyze the two factors separately:
i) 
qf˜ − ∑
j≥f˜w
∗
x¯f˜ ,j

 =

qf˜ − ∑
j≥f˜w
∗
(
k∑
l=1
αlx
µl
f˜ ,j
) =

qf˜ −
k∑
l=1
αl

 ∑
j≥f˜w
∗
xµ
l
f˜ ,j



 .
Since µt ≤f˜ µ
t−1[σ∗], we have that
∑
j≥f˜w
xµ
t
f˜ ,j
≤
∑
j≥f˜w
x
µt−1 [σ∗]
f˜ ,j
for all w ∈ W .
In particular for w = w∗, and the fact that w >f w
2 with w2 ∈ µt−1[σ∗](f˜), we have
that ∑
j≥f˜w
∗
xµ
t
f˜ ,j
≤
∑
j≥f˜w
∗
x
µt−1[σ∗]
f˜ ,j
< qf˜ .
By (8) we also have that for all l = 1, ..., k
∑
j≥f˜w
∗
xµ
l
f˜ ,j
≤ qf˜ .
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Using the decreasing sequence of stable matchings of Lemma 13, we have that αl > 0
for l = 1, ..., k. Then, we have that

qf˜ − ∑
j≥f˜w
∗
x¯f˜ ,j

 =

qf˜ −
k∑
l=1
αl

 ∑
j≥f˜w
∗
xµ
l
f˜ ,j



 >
[
qf˜ −
(
k∑
l=1
αlqf˜
)]
= 0
ii) 
1− ∑
i≥w∗ f˜
x¯i,w∗

 =

1− ∑
i≥w∗ f˜
(
α1x
µ1
i,w∗ +
k∑
l=2
αlx
µl
i,w∗
)
 =

1−

α1 ∑
i≥w∗ f˜
xµ
1
i,w∗ +
k∑
l=2
αl
∑
i≥w∗ f˜
xµ
l
i,w∗




By (8), we have that w∗ 6∈ µ1(f˜). Since µ1 >f˜ µ
t−1, we have that µt−1(w∗) = f˜ >w∗
µ1(w∗). Therefore, ∑
i≥w∗ f˜
xµ
1
i,w∗ = 0.
Since αl > 0 for l = 1, ..., k, then
1−

α1 ∑
i≥w∗ f˜
xµ
1
i,w∗ +
t∑
l=2
αl
∑
i≥w∗ f˜
xµ
l
i,w∗



 =

1− t∑
l=2
αl
∑
i≥w∗ f˜
xµ
l
i,w∗

 = 1− t∑
l=2
αl > 0.
Then from cases i) and ii), we have that for the pair (f˜ , w∗),

qf˜ − ∑
j≥f˜w
∗
x¯f˜ ,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥w∗ f˜
x¯i,w∗

 6= 0.
That is, for the pair (f˜ , w∗) Condition (6) fails.
b) If σ ∩ σ∗ = ∅ for all σ ∈ Φ(µ1). Notice that µt−1(f) 6= µt−1[σ∗](f) for all f ∈ σ∗.
In this case, we have that there exist f¯ ∈ σ∗ and w¯ ∈ W , such that for µ1(f¯) =
{wµ
1
1 , ..., w
µ1
qf¯
}, and µt−1(f¯) = {wµ
t−1
1 , ..., w
µt−1
qf¯
}. Notice that if qf = 1, we have that
wµ
1
1 = w
µ1
qf¯
, and wµ
t−1
1 = w
µt−1
qf¯
, but wµ
1
1 >f¯ w
µt−1
qf¯
. Then, we have that wµ
1
1 >f¯
w¯ >f¯ w
µt−1
qf¯
. Otherwise, for all f ∈ σ∗, we have that µ1(f) >f µt−1[σ∗](f) >f w,
for all w 6∈ µ1(f) ∪ µt−1[σ∗](f). Here µt−1[σ∗](f) >f w denotes that worker w is less
preferred for the firm f than all workers matched to firm f under the stable matching
µt−1[σ∗]. Since σ ∩ σ∗ = ∅, we have that µ1(f) = µt−1(f) for all f ∈ σ∗. Then, let
{wf} = µt−1[σ∗](f) \ µ1(f) for each f ∈ σ∗. That is, wf is the most preferred worker in
the reduced preference list Pµ
1
(f) such that it does not belong to µ1(f). This implies that
σ∗ ∈ Φ(µ1), and it is a contradiction since σ∗ 6∈ Φ(µ1).
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Therefore, we can assure that f¯ ∈ σ∗ and w¯ ∈W exist, such that
µ1(f¯) = µt−1(f¯) >f¯ w¯ >f¯ µ
t−1[σ∗](f¯) (9)
Since σ∗ ∈ Φ(µt−1), in order to obtain the reduced preference lists Pµ
t−1
, f¯ should have
eliminated w¯ by means of the third step of the reduction procedure. Then, we have that
µt(w¯) ≥w¯ µ
t−1[σ∗](w¯) >w¯ µ
t−1(w¯) >w¯ f¯ >w¯ µ
1(w¯). (10)
Since x¯ can be written as in Lemma 13, (µ1, µt−1 ∈ Mµx¯ and µ
t−1 >F µ
t), and using
inequalities (9) and (10), we have that
∑
j≥f¯ w¯
x¯f¯ ,j < qf¯ and
∑
i≥w¯ f¯
x¯i,w¯ < 1.
Then,

qf˜ − ∑
j≥f¯ w¯
x¯f¯ ,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥w¯ f¯
x¯i,w¯

 > 0.
That is, Condition (6) fails for the pair (f¯ , w¯).
Therefore, from cases a) and b), we have that x¯ ∈ Conv (Mµx¯).
Once we have characterized a strongly stable fractional matching for the many-to-one match-
ing market (F,W,P ), we can characterize the set of all strongly stable fractional matchings as
follows:
Corollary 2. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let SSq(P ) be the set of all
strongly stable fractional matchings. Then,
SSq(P ) =
⋃
µ∈S(P )
Conv{Mµ}
5 APPENDIX
The reduction procedure:
Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let f ∈ F , w ∈ W , µF the optimal stable
matching for all firms, and µW the optimal stable matching for all workers.
Step 1: Remove all w who are more preferred than the most preferred worker matched under
µF (f) from f ’s list of acceptable workers. Remove all f who are more preferred than µW (w)
from w’s list of acceptable firms.
Therefore, the most preferred worker matched in µF (f) will be the first entry in f ’s reduced
list, and µW (w) will be the first entry in w’s reduced list.
Step 2: Remove all f who are less preferred than µF (w) from w’s list of acceptable firms.
Remove all w who are less preferred than the least worker matched under µW (f) from f ’s list
of acceptable workers.
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Thus, µF (w) will be the last entry in w’s reduced list, and the least preferred worker in
µW (f) will be the last entry in f ’s reduced list.
Step 3: After steps 1 and 2, if f is not acceptable for w (i.e., if f is not on w’s preference list
as now modified), then remove w from f ’s list of acceptable workers, and similarly, remove from
w’s list of acceptable firms, any firm f to whom w is no longer acceptable.
Hence, f will be acceptable for w if and only if w is acceptable for f after Step 3.
In general, if µ is any stable matching, and we replace µF by µ in the reduction process, the
resulting profile will be called a profile of reduced lists Pµ.
For the matching market (F,W,Pµ), the stable matching µ is the F−optimal stable matching,
that is the stable matching that all firm prefere in the matching market (F,W,Pµ).
Lemmas and Proofs.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 7.
Let Pµ be a reduced preference profile. Let σs and σl be two different cycles in P
µ. By Lemma
5, we have that σs∩σl = ∅. Then, we can assume that σl = {e1, ..., er} and σs = {er+1, ..., er+r′}.
By Definition 6,
µ[σl](f) =


µ(e1) if f = er
µ(ek+1) if f = ek, k = 1, ..., r − 1
µ(f) if f 6∈ {e1, ..., er}.
That is, the firms that do not belong to the cycle σl do not change the set of workers in both
stable matchings (µ and µ[σl]). Then, by Lemma 5, the cycle σs is a subset of those firms that
do not change. That is, σs is a cycle of P
µ[σl].
Proof. Proof of Lemma 8.
Let Pµ be a profile of reduced lists for (F,W,P ), and let σs and σl be two different cycles
in Pµ. Let K = {σs, σl}. Since K is a set of cycles (not an ordered set), by Definition 6 and
Lemma 5, we have that
µ[K] (f) =


µ[σs](f) if f ∈ σs
µ[σl](f) if f ∈ σl
µ(f) otherwise.
Then, µ[σl, σs] = µ[σs, σl].
We define a way to compare fractional matchings as fallows:
Definition 9. A fractional matching x weakly dominates a fractional matching y with respect
to the preference of the firm f , if for all worker w,
∑
j≥fw
xf,j ≥
∑
j≥fw
yf,j ,
and it will be denoted by x f y.
We say that x strongly dominates y, denoted by x ≻f y, if the previous inequality holds
strictly for at least one worker w. Weak and strong domination under a worker’s preferences are
defined analogously. We say that x F y when x f y for all f ∈ F . Analogously, for x W y
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Lemma 10. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let µ ∈ S(P ), and Pµ the
reduced preference profile. Let x¯ be a stable fractional matching for a many-to-one matching
market (F,W,P ). If x¯ is a strongly stable fractional matching for a many-to-one matching
market (F,W,Pµ), then x¯ is a strongly stable fractional matching for a many-to-one matching
market (F,W,P ).
Proof. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let µ ∈ S(P ), and Pµ be the reduced
preference profile. Let x¯ be a stable fractional matching for a many-to-one matching market
(F,W,P ). Let x¯ be a strongly stable fractional matching for a many-to-one matching market
(F,W,Pµ), that is: 
qf − ∑
j≥µ
f
w
x¯f,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥µwf
x¯i,w

 = 0,
for all (f, w) ∈ A(Pµ).
We need to prove that, for all (f, w) ∈ A(P ), x¯ fulfills

qf − ∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w

 = 0.
We will consider the following two cases:
1. Let (f, w) ∈ A(Pµ). That is, (f, w) was not eliminated in Pµ. So,
∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j ≥
∑
j≥µ
f
w
x¯f,j
holds, since for each firm f , there are more workers in the original preference list than in
the reduced preference list.
Hence,
qf −
∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j ≤ qf −
∑
j≥µ
f
w
x¯f,j .
With a similar argument we have that
1−
∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w ≤ 1−
∑
i≥µwf
x¯i,w .
By hypothesis, and linear inequalities (1) and (2) of PC,
0 =

qf − ∑
j≥µ
f
w
x¯f,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥µwf
x¯i,w

 ≥

qf − ∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w

 ≥ 0.
Then, for (f, w) ∈ A(Pµ), we have that

qf − ∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w

 = 0.
2. Let (f, w) ∈ A(P )−A(Pµ). We will analyze two sub-cases:
20
i) w >f w1.
We have that xµ F x¯, then
∑
j>fw
x¯f,j ≤
∑
j>fw
xµ = 0. (11)
Since, x¯ is a stable fractional matching, x¯ satisfies inequalities (2) and (3) of PC, i.e.
∑
i∈F
x¯i,w ≤ 1 and
∑
j>fw
x¯f,j + qf
∑
i>wf
x¯i,w + qf x¯f,w ≥ qf .
Then, by condition (11)
qf
∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w ≥ qf ,
and for all i ≥w f , x¯i,w = 1. Hence,
∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w ≥ 1,
and by linear inequality (2), we have that
∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w = 1,
then we have that 
qf − ∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w

 = 0.
ii) w1 >f w. We will analyze two sub-cases, if the firm f does or does not fill its quota.
a) If the firm f does not fill its quota, by the Rural Hospital Theorem, the firm f
will be assigned to the same set of workers in every stable matching. Assume
that µ(f) = {w1, ..., wp} with p < qf . If w <f w1, we have that
0 <
∑
j>fw
x¯f,j < qf .
Then, we can have two cases, if
∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w = 1 or 0 <
∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w < 1.
If 0 <
∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w < 1, then
∑
i<wf
x¯i,w > 0. Since x¯ ∈ SS(Pµ), then by Corol-
lary 1 there exist µp stable matchings in (F,W,Pµ) and αp real numbers, such that
x¯ =
∑k
p=1 αpµ
p, with 0 < αp < 1 and
∑k
p=1 αp = 1. Since
∑
i<wf
x¯i,w > 0, then
there exists a stable matching µp for some p = 1, ..., k such that
∑
i<wf
xµ
p
i,w = 1.
Then, since (f, w) ∈ A(P ), the firm f does not fill its quota, and
∑
i<wf
xµ
p
i,w = 1,
we have that µp(w) <w f . Hence, (f, w) is a blocking pair for µ
p for some
p = 1, ..., k. Thus, this case does not occur.
Then
∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w = 1, therefore x¯ fulfills Condition (6).
b) If the firm f fill its quota, then we will consider the following 3 sub-cases:
Without loss of generality, we assume that µ(f) = {w1, ..., wq} and µW (f) =
{w′1, ..., w
′
q} and wl >f wl+1 and w
′
l >f w
′
l+1 for l = 1, ..., q − 1. Notice that,
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µ(f) ∩ µW (f) is not necessarily empty.
b1) w1 >f w >f wq .
Then, we have that ∑
j≥fw
xµf,j ≤ qf ,
since all stable matchings fulfill Condition (6), then
∑
i≥wf
xµi,w = 1.
But xµ F x¯, and by Lemma (11), we have that x¯ W xµ, then
1 =
∑
i≥wf
xµi,w ≤
∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w ≤ 1,
then ∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w = 1,
and 
qf − ∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w

 = 0.
b2) wq >f w >f w
′
q.
Since (f, w) 6∈ A(Pµ), then f was eliminated from the worker w’s preference
list Pµ. Then, for the worker w we have that f >w µW (w) or µ(w) >w f .
If f >w µW , then the pair (f, w) blocks the matching µW , then µ(w) >w f .
Therefore, by Lemma (11) we have that x¯ W xµ. Hence,
∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w ≥
∑
i≥wf
xµi,w = x
µ
µ(w),w = 1.
Since x¯ satisfies linear inequality (2), we have that
∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w = 1, then

qf − ∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w

 = 0.
b3) w
′
q >f w.
By Lemma (11) we have x¯ F xµW . Hence,
∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j ≥
∑
j≥fw
xµWf,j = qf .
Since x¯ satisfies linear inequality (1), we have that∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j = qf , then

qf − ∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j

 ·

1− ∑
i≥wf
x¯i,w

 = 0.
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From cases 1 and 2, we conclude that x¯ is a strongly stable fractional matching for the many-
to-one matching market (F,W,P ).
Lemma 11. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let x¯ be a strongly stable frac-
tional matching. Then, xµF f x¯ f xµW for all f ∈ F and xµW w x¯ w xµF for all w ∈W .
Proof. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let x¯ be a strongly stable fractional
matching. Since x¯ is a convex combination of stable matchings, we have that exists µk ∈ S(P )
and real numbers αk such that
x¯ =
t∑
k=1
αkx
µk ,
with 0 ≤ αk ≤ 1, and
∑t
k=1 αk = 1. Since µF >F µ
k >F µW for all µ
k ∈ S(P ), then for f ∈ F
we have that ∑
j≥fw
xµFf,j =
∑
j≥fw
(
t∑
k=1
αkx
µF
f,j
)
=
t∑
k=1
αk

∑
j≥fw
xµFf,j

 ≥
t∑
k=1
αk

∑
j≥fw
xµ
k
f,j

 = ∑
j≥fw
(
t∑
k=1
αkx
µk
f,j
)
=
∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j ,
for all w ∈ W . Then xµF f x¯.
To prove that x¯ f xµW ,
∑
j≥fw
x¯f,j =
∑
j≥fw
(
t∑
k=1
αkx
µk
f,j
)
=
t∑
k=1
αk

∑
j≥fw
xµ
k
f,j

 ≥
t∑
k=1
αk

∑
j≥fw
xµWf,j

 = ∑
j≥fw
(
t∑
k=1
αkx
µW
f,j
)
=
∑
j≥fw
xµWf,j ,
for all w ∈ W . Then x¯ f xµW .
A similar argument proves that xµW w x¯ w xµF .
Lemma 12. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let x¯ be a strongly stable frac-
tional matching and x¯ 6= xµx¯ . Let α = min{x¯f,w : (f, w) ∈ supp(x
µx¯)}.Then, y defined as:
y =
x¯− αxµx¯
1− α
is a strongly stable fractional matching, such that supp(y) ⊂ supp(x¯).
Proof. Let x¯ be a strongly stable fractional matching. Then, by Lemma (9) we have that µx¯
is a stable matching. By Definition 8 we have that supp(xµx¯) ⊂ supp(x¯), and by the fact that
x¯ 6= xµx¯ we have that
x¯ = αxµx¯ + (1 − α)y.
We need to prove that
y =
x¯− αxµx¯
1− α
is a strongly stable fractional matching. That is, y satisfies linear inequalities (1),(2),(4),(5) and
Condition (6).
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From x¯ 6= xµx¯ , we have that α > 0. From definition of α, we have that α < 1.
Assume that α = x¯f¯ ,w¯, with w¯ ∈ C
qf¯
f¯
(x¯).
• Inequality (1)
Following from the definition of y and the definition of α, we have that:
If |C0f (x¯)| ≥ qf , then
∑
j∈W
x¯f,j − α
∑
j∈W
xµx¯f,j =
∑
i∈W
x¯f,j − αqf ≤ qf − αqf .
Therefore, ∑
j∈W
yf,j =
1
1− α

∑
j∈W
x¯f,j − α
∑
j∈W
xµx¯f,j

 ≤ qf .
If |C0f (x¯)| = r < qf , then
∑
j∈W x¯f,j − α
∑
j∈W x
µx¯
f,j =
∑
i∈W x¯f,j − αr ≤ r − αr =
r(1 − α) < qf (1− α). Then,
∑
j∈W
yf,j =
1
1− α

∑
j∈W
x¯f,j − α
∑
j∈W
xµx¯f,j

 ≤ qf .
That is, y satisfy linear inequality (1).
• Inequality (2)
Similar argument that is used for Inequality (1), proves that y satisfy linear inequality (2).
• Inequality (4)
If (f, w) ∈ supp(x¯), by definition of µx¯, we shall consider two cases:
– If (f, w) 6∈ supp(xµx¯), that is, xµx¯f,w = 0. Then, yf,w =
x¯f,w
1−α = 0.
– If (f, w) ∈ supp(xµx¯), that is, xµx¯f,w = 1 and also x
µx¯
f¯ ,w¯
= 1.
Then, yf,w =
x¯f,w−αx
µx¯
f,w
1−α =
x¯f,w−α
1−α ≥ 0. Then, for (f, w) ∈ A, yf,w ≥ 0, that is y satisfies
linear inequality (4).
• Inequality (5)
Inequality (5) it is straight forward satisfy form definition of y.
• Condition (6). Since, xµx¯ and y satisfies linear inequalities (1), (2), (4) and (5), and
x¯ = αxµx¯ +(1−α)y, by Lemma 2, the fractional matching y is a strongly stable fractional
matching.
Since supp(xµx¯) ⊆ suup(x¯), we have that supp(y) ⊆ supp(x¯). Moreover, since yf¯ ,w¯ = 0, and
xµx¯
f¯ ,w¯
= 1, then supp(y) ⊂ supp(x¯).
Note that here we use ”⊂” to denote the strict inclusion; that is, A ⊂ B means that A is a
proper subset of B.
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Lemma 13. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market. Let x¯ be a strongly stable frac-
tional matching. Then, x¯ can be written as:
x¯ =
k∑
l=1
αlx
µl , 0 < αl ≤ 1,
k∑
l=1
αl = 1, (12)
with µl ∈ S(P ) for l = 1, ..., k and µ1 >F µ2 >F ... >F µk.
Proof. Let (F,W,P ) be a many-to-one matching market and let x¯ be a strongly stable fractional
matching.
Denote by µ1 = µx¯, where µx¯ is defined by Definition 8 and by Lemma 9 is stable.
If x¯ = xµ
1
(i.e., x¯ is a stable matching), then x¯ can be written according to (12) for k = 1,
and α1 = 1.
If x¯ 6= xµ
1
(i.e., x¯ is not a stable matching). Then, according to Lemma 12, there is a strongly
stable fractional matching, x2, defined by
x2 =
x¯− α′1x
µ1
1− α′1
,
for some 0 < α′1 < 1, and supp
(
x2
)
⊂ supp (x¯). Then,
x¯ = (1− α′1)x
2 + α′1x
µ1 . (13)
for 0 < α′1 < 1 and supp (x
µ1) ⊂ supp (x¯).
For the strongly stable fractional matching x2, denote by µ2 = µx2 to the stable matching
according to Definition 8.
Notice that, from the fact that supp (xµ1 ) ⊂ supp (x¯), supp
(
x2
)
⊂ supp (x¯) and definitions
of µ1 and x2, we can conclude that µ1 >F µ
2.
If x2 = xµ
2
(i.e., x2 is a stable matching), then x¯ can be written according to (12).
If x2 6= xµ
2
(i.e., x2 is not a stable matching), again by Lemma 12, there is a strongly stable
fractional matching x3, defined by
x3 =
x2 − α′2x
µ2
1− α′2
,
for some 0 < α′2 < 1 and supp
(
x3
)
⊂ supp
(
x2
)
. That is,
x2 = (1− α′2)x
3 + α′2x
µ2 . (14)
Since 0 < α′2 < 1, we have that supp (x
µ2 ) ⊂ supp
(
x2
)
. Denote by µ3 = µx3 to the stable
matching according to Definition 8. Since supp
(
x3
)
⊂ supp
(
x2
)
, we have that µ2 >F µ3. Then,
µ1 >F µ
2 >F µ
3.
If x3 = xµ
3
(i.e., x3 is a stable matching), from equalities (13) and (14) we have that
x¯ = (1− α′1)x
2 + α′1x
µ1
= (1− α′1)
(
(1− α′2)x
3 + α′2x
µ2
)
+ α′1x
µ1
= (1− α′1) (1− α
′
2)x
3 + (1− α′1)α
′
2x
µ2 + α′1x
µ1 .
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Then x¯ can be written according to (12) for k = 3, with α1 = α
′
1, α2 = (1− α
′
1)α
′
2, and
α3 = (1− α
′
1) (1− α
′
2). Notice that α1 + α2 + α3 = 1.
If x3 6= xµ3 (i.e., x3 is not a stable matching), then we continue this procedure. The finiteness
of the supp (x¯) guarantees that this procedure ends by constructing a stable matching. This
proves that x¯ can be written according to (12) for some k ≥ 1.
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